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ABSTRACT 
Following financial scandals at the turn of the century, the audit profession in the 
European Union, the United States and elsewhere, has undergone profound legislative 
and regulatory reforms, including the requirement for intense public oversight of the 
profession. The article provides an overview of the development of external quality 
assurance systems in the audit profession in the EU and the U.S. with emphasis on the 
system of public oversight, implemented after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 in the U.S. and the Statutory Audit Directive of 2006 in the EU. The aims of the 
article are: 1) to explain different backgrounds of external quality assurance systems in 
the EU and the U.S., 2) to describe implemented practices related to the public over-
sight system in the two regions and 3) to present the main findings of the existing 
empirical research focusing on the impact of the newly established systems of public 
oversight on the quality of audit services. Our literature research reveals that the evi-
dence on the impact of the public oversight on the ultimate audit quality in the EU has 
not yet been provided because the Member States have only finished the implementati-
on of the Statutory Audit Directive requirements into national legislations by the year 
2008. In the U.S., on the other hand, first empirical evidence has been presented, sug-
gesting that the quality of auditing has improved after the passing of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002. So far evidence has been provided to support the proposition that 
PCAOB opinions are associated with earnings quality of the audit firm’s clients, that 
auditors have become more conservative and that the new inspectors (as opposed to 
the former system of self-regulation) can hold the auditors to stricter standards by 
taking concrete actions against felonious auditors and imposing costly penalties. 
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1.? Introduction 
 
Following the milestones of economic development, specialized areas 
of interest have developed within the accounting profession and a variety 
of accounting-related professions have emerged. Development of different 
accounting-related professions (e.g. financial and management accounting, tax 
consulting and auditing) followed the need for specialized services, sought by 
the state, public sector and business. Comparing different accounting-related 
professions it is crucial to emphasize that the majority, such as financial and 
management accounting, cost accounting and tax consulting have always been 
driven by private interest. In its early history, the auditing profession was no 
exception to this rule.  
The period of the industrial revolution and high economic growth in 
Europe (the period between years 1750 and 1850) was the period of transfor-
mation of successful entrepreneurs and small family businesses into large 
industrial corporations. The period, following the industrial revolution and the 
separation of owners from the management, especially the second half of the 
19th century, was the period of increasing role of auditors and the rise of the 
audit profession. At this time, auditors became important players in resolving 
the agency problem between diverse interests of owners (principals) and their 
appointed managers (agents). Auditors acted in the interest of owners to 
whom they periodically reported on the completed audits. Consequently, audit-
ing contributed to improved quality of information flows and played important 
role in decreasing information asymmetry between principals and agents. As 
auditors were not only expected to detect clerical errors and omissions in fi-
nancial statements, but also to report on any evidence of management fraud, 
they had to be independent of management.  
With further development of financial markets the provision of an inde-
pendent opinion on the financial statements to the general public became the 
primary objective of an audit and the auditors were recognized to act in public 
interest. The main audit objective gradually changed from the detection of 
fraud to reporting on the actual financial condition of an entity. Audited financial 
statements became crucial for functioning of capital markets because the au-
diting process reduced the information asymmetry between the management 
and diverse groups of players on capital markets. Several researchers have 
studied the relation between audit quality and its impact on financial state-
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ments credibility. Alles, Kogan and Vasarhelyi (2004, p. 184) claimed that 
assurance added value to communications between an auditee and its audi-
ence and that the degree to which audited financial statements added this 
value was directly related to the credibility of the auditor. Similarly, Teoh and 
Wong (1993, p. 365) provided evidence that companies increased the credibility of 
their financial statements by appointing high-quality auditors. Hillary and Len-
nox (2005, p. 216) suggested that an audit firm’s average client preferred a 
high-quality auditing since high-quality auditing helps to reduce information risk 
and the cost of capital. 
Today, among different accounting-related professions, only the audit pro-
fession is closely related to the public interest and is therefore most regulated. 
Consequently, the requests for and standards of external quality assurance 
systems for statutory audits have been included in national auditing regulations 
already before the profound changes in the profession-related regulation, repre-
sented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the U.S. and the Directive 
2006/43/EC (Statutory Audit Directive) in Europe.  
Inclusion of quality assurance requests in national legislations of individual 
states was crucial because although audit reports did refer to the use of audit-
ing standards and declared auditor’s independence in the title of the report 
itself (“independent auditor’s report”), there was no other assurance whether 
the audit was truly carried out in conformity with the standards declared in the 
report and whether the independence-related rules were respected, not to 
mention an essential question, what provisions the independence-related rules 
included. The need for external monitoring of audit profession originated from 
request for appropriate quality of audit services, including the auditor’s inde-
pendence. 
External quality assurance system is the profession’s principal means of 
demonstrating to the public, to regulators and other interested parties that 
auditors are performing at a level that meets the established auditing stan-
dards as well as ethical rules. In addition, it encourages the profession to im-
plement quality improvements in auditing methods. Surveys, related to effects 
of quality assurance on quality of statutory audits (Recommendation on quality 
assurance for the statutory audits in the European Union, 2000) demonstrate 
that quality assurance is actually adding value in detecting and preventing 
weaknesses in the audit process and that it results in improvements of audit-
ing procedures and internal quality control systems of audit firms. Taking into 
consideration that already in year 2000 statutory audits were mandatory in over 
Maja Zaman Groff, Marko Ho~evar 
Public oversight of the audit profession – Comparison  
of implemented practices in the EU and the U.S. 
Uprava, letnik VII, 3/2009 64
three million limited liability and joint stock companies across the EU under  
the two accounting directives (at that time the 4th Directive on the Annual 
accounts of certain types of companies and the 7th Directive on Consolidated 
accounts of companies with limited liability), and that the 8th Directive at that 
time did not contain specific guidance related to audit function and external 
quality assurance, audit regimes and quality assurance systems differed sig-
nificantly between different EU Member States as well as the U.S. 
 
 
2.? Quality assurance for the statutory audit in the 
EU and the U.S. before the recent financial 
scandals 
 
Due to lack of any specific guidelines, a number of different external 
quality assurance systems have developed in practice. Depending on the 
status of persons in charge of carrying out the quality assurance, these can 
generally be classified as variations of two principal types of systems: monitor-
ing and peer review (Public Oversight of the Accounting Profession in Europe, 
2007, p.12): 
?? Monitoring refers to a situation where quality assurance reviews are 
undertaken by staff employed by an independent review organization 
(professional body or regulator).  
?? Peer review refers to a situation where the review organization organ-
izes and supervises the reviews undertaken by experienced and au-
thorized practitioners of audit firms or statutory auditors (hence the 
reference to “peer”), working on the contract basis.  
?
Observing the divergent ways of external quality assurance development, 
the European Commission issued its first recommendations on quality assur-
ance in November 2000 (Recommendation on quality assurance for the statu-
tory audit in the European Union – Minimum requirements, 2000). The goal of 
these recommendations was to ensure that all statutory audits were covered 
by equivalent quality assurance systems with sufficient public oversight. The 
ultimate purpose of improved quality insurance in the audit profession was to 
improve the reliability and comparability of financial information and to  
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restore confidence in the efficient functioning of the EU capital markets.  
The Recommendation on quality assurance for the statutory audit was passed 
as a result of the discussions within the EU Committee on Auditing, which is 
composed of representatives from the Member States and the European audit 
profession. The minimum requirements related to the implementation of qual-
ity assurance systems in the Member States still allowed certain flexibility: 
both basic methodologies (monitoring and peer review) were acknowledged 
when appropriate safeguards were applied. On the other hand, the ambition of 
the recommendation was to change the existing situation where not all EU 
statutory auditors were obliged to be covered by a quality assurance system 
(before the recommendation was passed some Member States did not have a 
system for quality assurance at all, whereas in other Member States coverage 
existed only voluntarily). The ultimate goal of the recommendation was to im-
prove the quality of auditing services throughout the EU by encouraging quality 
assurance systems, which put forward specific requirements such as the fre-
quency and the scope of the quality reviews and confidentiality. In particular, 
the requirements for public oversight composed of a majority of non-
practitioners, publication of the results and the possibility of access to the re-
view files by the competent authorities were the major contributions of the 
recommendation to upgrade the existing quality assurance systems (Recom-
mendation on quality assurance for the statutory audit in the European Union – 
Minimum requirements, 2000). 
In the U.S., the roots of the external quality assurance systems in the au-
diting profession can be traced to the early 1970’s, when the profession be-
came self-regulated following several accounting scandals that involved fraudu-
lent financial reporting and caused the public to question audit effectiveness. 
After hearings at the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, the SEC Prac-
tice Section (SECPS) was established by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) and any AICPA member firm that was engaged in 
auditing financial statements of public companies was required to belong to 
the SECPS and was required to undergo a peer review at least once every 
three years (Lennox & Pittman, 2009, p.3). On the other hand, audit firms with 
no public company clients were given an option to join voluntarily and these 
firms were also subject to peer reviews (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p.214). The 
primary focus of the peer review process was on the overall quality of the au-
dit firm and the reviewers documented their findings in “peer review opinions” 
that were publicly available. In their reports, reviewers disclosed any system-
atic weakness found and issued an opinion that could be either “clean” (if 
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they found no significant weaknesses at the audit firm), “unmodified with 
weaknesses” (if weaknesses were significant but not serious), “modified” (if 
weaknesses were serious) or “adverse” (if weaknesses were very serious). 
Hilary and Lennox (2005) provided first evidence on the credibility of AICPA 
peer reviews. They carried out an extensive survey in which they studied 
whether the opinions issued by the peer reviewers provided credible informa-
tion to clients about audit firm quality. They investigated the credibility of peer 
reviews by examining audit firm dismissals and appointments in the 12-month 
period following issuance of peer review opinions and found that the reviewed 
firms gained clients after receiving clean opinions and lost clients after receiv-
ing modified or adverse opinions. Their tests indicated that peer reviews were 
perceived informative about the quality of the audit firms. Casterella, Jensen 
and Knechel (2009, p.732) also found that there was a predictable link between 
the number of weaknesses identified in a firm’s peer review report and the 
likelihood of that audit firm having a malpractice claim filed against it. Similarly, 
in their discussion of the changing role of audit committees in the corporate 
governance process, Woodlock and Claypool (2001) pointed out several di-
mensions that should be considered at the audit committee meetings to im-
prove its oversight and the confidence in the company’s financial statements. 
In the context of the external auditor selection they suggest the audit commit-
tee members to review a copy of the external auditor’s latest peer review be-
cause “audit committees that review the peer review are in a better position 
to determine whether the external auditor is suited for auditing the company’s 
records” (Woodlock and Claypool, 2001, p. 30).  
The debate between advocates and opponents of the implemented qual-
ity assurance system through the self-regulation was strident and it was be-
coming increasingly a political one. Among the advocates of the system, 
Charles Kaiser, a former chair of the AICPA, stated that self-regulation provided 
credibility, generated public trust and reduced unnecessary and costly gov-
ernmental intervention (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p. 214). On the other hand, 
peer review has come under considerable criticism from many members of 
the Congress, the media and others. The critics of self-regulation had argued 
that peer reviews lacked credibility (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p. 212) and the 
prevailing cynical view of these reviews by their opponents was consolidated 
in the following statement: “You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” (Lennox 
& Pittman, 2009, p. 3). This and other critiques were mainly related to the gen-
eral lack of independence among reviewers and reviewees (Anantharaman, 
2007, p. 8). The generally perceived lack of independence was primarily  
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the consequence of possibility that the reviewee was allowed to choose the 
audit firm to carry out the peer review. 
Following the financial scandals at the turn of the century, the audit pro-
fession has lost the confidence of all groups of players on financial markets. 
After long centuries of building the profession, it suddenly seemed to have 
reached the point of “dead end”. Major players (governments, regulators, pub-
lic agencies, investors and others) soon agreed that the profession that had 
been designated to act in the interest of public, has shifted its course to begin 
acting in the interest of profit. Unfortunately the consensus on the need for 
immediate action, in the sense of profound changes in the profession-related 
regulation, was reached too late to prevent the damage to financial markets 
and profession itself. The ambition to restore public confidence in audit profes-
sion, improve reliability of publicly available financial information and stabilize 
financial markets, led to profound legislative and regulatory reforms in the field 
of the audit profession in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere. These reforms 
have redefined the roles of all players related to a public company’s financial 
reporting process (management, internal and external auditors, boards of direc-
tors, supervisory boards and audit committees) and have highlighted the re-
quirement for intense public oversight of the audit profession. 
?
?
3.? Development of public oversight of the audit 
profession as the consequence of recent  
financial scandals 
 
The recent financial scandals, especially Enron and Worldcom, that 
caused the fall of one of the big players in the auditing services market, Arthur 
Andersen, have heavily undermined public confidence in the audit profession. 
Alles, Kogan and Vasarhelyi (2004, p. 188) point out that the prevailing theory 
behind corporate failure in the mind of the public was that “it is due to deliber-
ate fraud between managers, aided and abetted by auditors, who, at best, are 
incompetent and, at worst, corrupt and outright compliant”. Considering such 
prevailing view of the audit report users it was clear that significant modifica-
tions, regarding the oversight of the audit profession, were indispensable. Re-
storing auditor credibility was one of the major ambitions of both, the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S. and the Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC)  
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in the EU. This issue was given a priority due to the importance of audited 
financial statements in facilitating capital market transactions. 
In the following two sections we present the characteristics of the newly 
implemented public oversight systems in the EU and the U.S. Because there is 
a high possibility that the new practices influence auditors’ incentives, we are 
convinced that it is of major importance to study their impact on ultimate audit 
quality. DeFond (2009, p. 1) points out that while auditor incentives, most 
commonly associated with audit quality, are litigation and reputation concerns, 
oversight mechanisms that are used to monitor the profession are also likely to 
impact auditors’ incentives. Therefore, at the end of each section, we attempt 
to provide any existing empirical evidence related to efficiency of the public 
oversight systems on the quality of audit services provided by audit firms.   
3.1?Public oversight of the audit profession in the EU 
In the EU, criteria for the quality assurance system were put forward in 
the Statutory Audit Directive in June 2006. With its principal scope to ensure 
consistently high quality of auditing services in all EU Member States, the Di-
rective introduced a requirement for all statutory auditors and audit firms to be 
subject to a system of an independent quality assurance, organized independ-
ently from the reviewed statutory auditors and audit firms and subject to public 
oversight on the basis of home country control. The requirements of the Direc-
tive called for profound changes of quality assurance arrangements in a num-
ber of European countries.  
Although the new requirements related to the audit profession entailed 
adjustments in national legislation of the Member States, the Directive still 
allows for considerable differences regarding how external quality assurance 
systems for statutory auditors and audit firms can be set up. In general, the 
two types of quality assurance systems that have been introduced already 
before the Statutory Audit Directive (monitoring and peer review), can be 
found in Europe. In monitoring, quality assurance reviews are undertaken by 
staff employed by a review organization. In peer review, the review organiza-
tion organizes and supervises the reviews to be undertaken by experienced 
and authorized practitioners of audit firms or statutory auditors. Despite these 
differences, both systems of monitoring and peer review are considered to 
comply with the Statutory Audit Directive. Under either of the existing two 
systems, the newly established public oversight body may also attend the 
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reviews as part of its oversight work. Several EU countries have selected the 
monitoring approach to exercise the oversight of the audit profession. Repre-
sentatives of this group of countries are Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Spain, 
Cyprus and Slovenia. On the other hand, the peer review approach was cho-
sen by Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Greece and Luxemburg. In 
practice, also a combined approach can be found. Such approach refers to a 
situation where oversight is primarily carried out by independent professionals, 
employed at professional institutes, in co-operation with auditors-practitioners 
working on a contractual basis. The primary advantage of this approach is that 
contractual partners have valuable experience in auditing and knowledge re-
garding business operation in specific business areas. The combined approach 
can be found in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and France 
(Quality assurance arrangements across Europe, 2006).      
In the Directive not only types of selected quality assurance systems but 
also the system of their financing is subject to independent decision, taken by 
the Member State. Consequently, considerable differences regarding the pub-
lic oversight financing exist among different EU countries. In table 1 we pre-
sent the financing arrangements of the public oversight system in four se-
lected EU countries and Switzerland.   
Table 1 reveals that significant differences exist among European coun-
tries regarding financing of the public oversight systems across Europe. Taking 
into consideration the number of audit firms and the number of auditors, regis-
tered in different countries, it is still evident, that the total yearly available 
funds vary significantly among selected countries. Also, while the majority of 
countries have built the financing system of their public oversight on yearly 
fees, collected from auditors and audit firms, in some countries the public 
oversight system is financed exclusively from the state budget.  
We believe that existing differences of established public oversight prac-
tices in different Member States raise a number of highly interesting ques-
tions. First, it can be assumed that the total amount of yearly available funds 
affects the quality of the work performed by the public oversight body. But the 
comparison of the funding systems and, particularly, the type of financing, also 
reveals that in countries with smallest amounts of yearly funds they are fi-
nanced through the state budget and are therefore highly independent from 
auditors and audit firms. 
?
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Table 1: Comparison of financing arrangements of the public oversight 
system in selected European countries 
?
 Finland The Netherlands Sweden Switzerland Slovenia 
Number of 
audit firms 
74 485 111 3067 52 
Number of 
auditors 
n.a. 1438 4108 6545 208 
Public  
oversight 
body 
Auditing Board 
of the Central 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Authority for the 
Financial Markets 
(AFM) – Audit firm 
supervision  
department 
 
Supervisory 
Board of 
Public  
Accountants 
Switzerland’s 
Federal Audit 
Oversight  
Authority 
Agency for 
Public  
Oversight of 
the audit  
profession 
Type of 
financing 
Yearly fees 
from audit 
firms 
Yearly fees from 
audit firms 
Yearly fees 
from auditors
Yearly fees from 
audit firms and 
auditors 
Financed 
exclusively 
from budget 
(180.000 
EUR) 
Yearly 
amount  
of fees 
collected 
700.000 EUR 
(expected rise 
to 1 mio EUR) 
Must be approved 
by the Ministry of 
Finance regarding 
planned activities 
 
4,2 mio EUR 4,2 mio EUR 0 
Number of 
employees 
9 20 20 22 5 
Source: Financing of public oversight bodies, 2009 (adopted) 
 
As countries with higher budgets are mostly financed by the fees col-
lected from auditors and/or audit firms, this raises the question of independ-
ence which is (in theory and practice) highly related with the audit quality. And 
second, no evidence has so far been provided on influence of the type of the 
quality assurance system selected (monitoring or peer review) on audit quality. 
It is important to point out that within both systems special attention should be 
paid to specific aspects of the quality assurance system. In the monitoring 
system it is crucial to maintain high experience levels and professional compe-
tencies for reviewers. In the peer review system the emphasis is focused on 
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compliance with the independence-related standards. An interesting question 
arising from the debate on the trade-off between expertise and independence 
and its influence on the quality of work performed by the oversight body has 
not yet been answered. 
3.2? Public oversight of the audit profession in the U.S. 
In the U.S., at the time of financial scandals, audit firms had been subject 
to self-regulation under peer review for nearly 25 years. The financial reporting 
failures renewed the on-going concerns about the effectiveness of self-
regulation, the peer review program and the discussion whether monitoring 
separate from the profession is essential for ensuring high-quality auditing 
(Lennox, Pittman, 2009, p. 1). Empirical research, focusing on the period be-
fore the financial scandals, reveals mixed results regarding the efficiency of the 
existing quality assurance system. On one hand, survey results supported the 
high information value of peer reviews. The survey, carried out by Hilary and 
Lennox (2005) provided evidence that peer-review reports were associated 
with perceived audit quality. Their work was extended by Casterella, Jensen 
and Knechel (2009), who tested if peer review opinions were also associated 
with actual audit quality. Their research provides evidence that peer review 
opinions were associated with actual audit quality in the sense of predicting 
audit failure such as malpractice claims alleging auditor negligence, overwork-
ing staff and taking on risky clients (Casterella, Jensen & Knechel, 2009, p. 
732). On the other hand, an important factor, adding to the debate whether the 
self-regulation of the profession failed to protect investors against poor quality 
audits, was the fact that Deloitte and Touche gave Arthur Andersen a favorable 
opinion even after the Enron and other potential audit failures came to light. 
Moreover, despite many publicly known cases of audit failure, none of the 
major audit firms has ever received a negative peer review opinion (Alles, Ko-
gan & Vasarhelyi, 2004, p. 185). Casterella, Jensen and Knechel (2009, p. 714) 
indicate that the general observation (although at that time not yet systemati-
cally studied) was that most audit failures involved firms receiving clean (un-
modified) peer-review reports. On basis of extent literature review they also 
point out the evidence that peer-reviews report relatively few weaknesses, 
that almost all peer-reviews result in unmodified reports, that most audit 
failures involve peer-reviewed firms and that peer-review cannot be effec-
tive because of the general lack of independence between reviewers and 
reviewees.  
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The system of oversight of the audit profession was profoundly changed 
following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, when the system of self-regulation 
through peer review process for the audit firms with SEC clients was replaced 
by independent inspections, carried out by the newly created body, the Public 
Company Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB). Under the new legisla-
tion, audit firms are required to undergo PCAOB inspection annually if they 
audit at least 100 public companies and triennially if they have less than 100 
clients among public companies (Anantharaman, 2007, p. 10). On the other 
hand, audit firms with no SEC clients continue to be subject to peer reviews, 
administered by the AICPA. One of the consequences of the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act, regarding the establishment of the PCAOB was that 47 small audit firms 
ceased auditing public clients during the period immediately following the pas-
sage of SOX. The survey of the factors behind their decision revealed that 
concerns about the PCAOB inspections were the auditors’ primary reasons for 
exiting the industry (DeFond, 2009). 
 
 
4.? Empirical evidence on the impact of the newly 
established public oversight systems on quality 
of audit services 
 
In the U.S., an increasing number of researchers have been focusing their 
empirical research on comparison between the self-regulation of the audit 
profession and the new public oversight practices. Anantharaman (2007, p. 33) 
found that firms that themselves review other firms consistently receive more 
favorable opinions from peer reviewers than from PCAOB reviews and that 
firms with peer reviewers who are less likely to be independent (such as 
smaller, non-competing firms) and firms likely to be »peer review specialists« 
also receive significantly more favorable opinions from peer review than from 
the PCAOB. Gunny and Zhang (2006, p. 12) found that peer review opinions 
were not associated with earnings quality of the audit firm’s clients whereas 
they found evidence to support the proposition that PCAOB opinions were 
associated with earnings quality of the audit firm’s clients. They confirmed that 
audit firms that receive favorable PCAOB opinions have clients with higher 
earnings quality. Moreover, DeFond (2009, p.2) concludes that the new inspec-
tors can hold the auditors to stricter standards by imposing costly penalties: 
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“…unlike the peer reviewers the PCAOB inspectors are able to take actions 
against felonious auditors which can result in large penalties. These actions 
can include notifying the SEC of auditor transgressions, notifying the Justice 
Department of possible criminal violations, and disciplinary proceedings by the 
PCAOB itself”. Consequently, he argues that auditors might have incentives to 
improve audit quality in anticipation of the inspections. Some evidence sug-
gesting that the quality of auditing and the quality of financial reporting have 
improved after the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 has also been 
presented by Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008), confirming that earnings manage-
ment has been declining and by Lobo and Zhou (2006) pointing out that after 
the passing of the SOX, auditors appear to be increasingly conservative.    
In the EU, on the other hand, the Member States have only finished the 
implementation of the Statutory Audit Directive requirements into national 
legislations by the year 2008. In the U.S., at least 4 years have passed from 
the reform (2002) to the publication of first contributions in high quality ac-
counting journals such as Accounting Horizons (Lobo and Zhou, 2006), The 
Accounting Review (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008) and Journal of Accounting and 
Economics (DeFond, 2009). In our opinion, the finding, that no empirical evi-
dence has so far been provided on how the newly established systems of 
public oversight in various EU Member States influence the ultimate quality of 
audit services, can be mainly contributed to the fact that so far no comparable 
sets of data have been available to allow for a high quality statistical analysis.   
??
?
5.? Conclusion 
 
Following the financial scandals at the turn of the century, the audit pro-
fession has lost the confidence of all groups of players on financial markets. 
The ambition to restore public confidence in audit profession, improve reliabil-
ity of publicly available financial information and stabilize financial markets, led 
to profound legislative and regulatory reforms in the field of the audit profes-
sion in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere. These reforms included the re-
quirement for intense public oversight of the audit profession. Preliminary 
surveys, related to effects of quality assurance systems on quality of statu-
tory audits demonstrated that quality assurance was actually adding value 
in detecting and preventing weaknesses in the audit process and that it 
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resulted in improvements of auditing procedures and internal quality control 
systems of audit firms.  
In the article we explained different backgrounds of external quality assur-
ance systems in the EU and the U.S., described implemented practices related 
to the public oversight system in the two regions and presented the main find-
ings of the existing empirical research focusing on the impact of the newly 
established systems of public oversight on the quality of audit services pro-
vided by audit firms.  
Studying the consequences of implementation of the new public over-
sight is a matter of high importance for two reasons. First, this issue is related 
to a long-standing debate regarding the trade-off between expertise (repre-
sented by the oversight through monitoring and peer reviews by professional 
organizations) on one hand and independence (represented by the more objec-
tive public oversight of the profession) on the other. Second, it is crucial to 
know how the new quality assurance system affects the ultimate quality of the 
audit services provided and how it signals actual audit quality.  
Our research of published contributions of various researchers, focusing 
their empirical studies on the impact of public oversight system on quality of 
audit services provided by audit firms reveals that the evidence for the EU has 
not yet been provided because the Member States have only finished the im-
plementation of the Statutory Audit Directive requirements into national legis-
lations by the year 2008. In the U.S., on the other hand, first empirical evi-
dence has already been presented. Various researchers report empirical results 
in support of the proposition that the quality of auditing has improved after the 
passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. So far evidence has been provided 
to confirm that earnings management has been declining, that auditors have 
become more conservative and that the new PCAOB inspectors can hold the 
auditors to stricter standards by taking concrete actions against felonious audi-
tors and by imposing costly penalties.  
?
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POVZETEK 
 
JAVNI NADZOR NAD REVIDIRANJEM -  
PRIMERJAVA SISTEMOV, UVEDENIH V  EVROPSKI 
UNIJI IN V ZDRUŽENIH DRŽAVAH AMERIKE  
 
 
Vzporedno z glavnimi mejniki v zgodovini gospodarskega razvoja so 
se v okviru ra~unovodske stroke razvijala specializirana podro~ja, na kate-
rih se je oblikovalo ve~ z ra~unovodstvom povezanih poklicev. Razvoj 
tak{nih poklicev (npr. finan~ni ra~unovodja, dav~ni svetovalec, revizor) je 
sledil potrebam po specializiranih ra~unovodskih storitvah, po katerih sta 
povpra{evala tako javni kot tudi gospodarski sektor. Ob primerjavi raz-
li~nih, z ra~unovodstvom povezanih dejavnosti, je pomembno poudariti, 
da ve~ino teh, kot so na primer finan~no (pa tudi stro{kovno ali poslovod-
no) ra~unovodstvo in dav~no svetovanje, že od samega za~etka usmerja 
zasebni interes. V svoji zgodnji zgodovini je to pravilo veljalo tudi za poklic 
revizorja. Danes je med vsemi ra~unovodskimi poklici le poklic revizorja 
tesno povezan z javnim interesom in je zato med vsemi poklici tudi najbolj 
zakonsko reguliran in nadziran. Glede na to, da se nadzor nad kakovostjo 
izvajanja ra~unovodskih poklicev, ki jih usmerja zasebni interes, izvaja na 
trgu prek ponudbe in povpra{evanja, je treba nadzor nad kakovostjo 
opravljanja revizijske dejavnosti zakonsko regulirati, da bi zagotovili in 
ohranili delovanje v javnem interesu.  
Vklju~itev zahtev po vzpostavitvi primernega sistema obvladovanja 
kakovosti revizijskega dela v  zakonodajo je izredno pomembna za ures-
ni~evanje javnega interesa na podro~ju revidiranja. ^eprav so se revizorji 
v revizijskih poro~ilih že pred vklju~itvijo teh zahtev v zakonodajo skliceva-
li na uporabo revizijskih standardov in izrecno izjavljali svojo neodvisnost 
že v samem naslovu revizorjevega poro~ila (»poro~ilo neodvisnega revi-
zorja«), dejanskega zagotovila, da so bili revizijski standardi pri izvedbi 
revizije resni~no upo{tevani in so bila upo{tevana vsa pravila, povezana z 
neodvisnostjo revizorja, ni bilo. Potreba po zunanjem nadzoru nad revidi-
ranjem tako izhaja iz zahteve po ustrezni kakovosti revizijskih storitev, 
vklju~no z zagotavljanjem revizorjeve neodvisnosti. 
Primerno zasnovan in dosledno izvajan sistem zunanjega obvladovan-
ja kakovosti revizijskih storitev je najbolj u~inkovit na~in, s katerim revizor 
svojim strankam, državi in javnosti dokazuje, da izvaja revizijske storitve  
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v skladu z zahtevami revizijskih standardov in eti~nih na~el. Poleg tega 
tak{en sistem spodbuja uvajanje izbolj{av v revizijske postopke. Raziska-
ve, ki se osredoto~ajo na prou~evanje u~inkov zunanjega obvladovanja 
kakovosti zakonskih revizij v Evropski uniji, kažejo, da ustrezno zasnovani 
in izvajani sistemi dejansko pripomorejo k odkrivanju in prepre~evanju 
pomanjkljivosti v procesu revidiranja in se zrcalijo v ve~ji kakovosti oprav-
ljenih revizijskih storitev (Recommendation on quality assurance for the 
statutory audits in the European Union, 2000). Upo{tevaje podatek, da je 
bilo v Evropski uniji že v letu 2000 kar tri milijone družb z omejeno odgo-
vornostjo in delni{kih družb zavezanih k obvezni reviziji letnih 
ra~unovodskih izkazov v skladu z ra~unovodskima direktivama (s tedanji-
ma ~etrto direktivo o letnih ra~unovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb 
in sedmo direktivo o konsolidiranih ra~unovodskih izkazih) in da osma 
(revizijska) direktiva v tem ~asu {e ni vsebovala posebnih navodil v zvezi s 
sistemom obvladovanja kakovosti revizijskih storitev, so se v posameznih 
državah oblikovali zelo razli~ni sistemi obvladovanja kakovosti revizijske-
ga dela.    
Nedavni finan~ni {kandali, predvsem Enron in Worldcom (ki sta povz-
ro~ila padec enega izmed najve~jih akterjev na trgu revizijskih storitev, 
revizijske družbe Arthur Andersen), so mo~no zamajali zaupanje javnosti v 
revizijsko stroko. Alles, Kogan in Vasarhelyi (2004, str. 188) navajajo, da je 
bilo prevladujo~e javno mnenje po izbruhu finan~nih {kandalov, da gre za 
»…posledice namernih poslovodskih prevar ob pomo~i revizorjev, ki so v 
najbolj{em primeru nesposobni, v najslab{em primeru pa podkupljeni«. 
Upo{tevaje tak{en prevladujo~ pogled na kakovost revizijskih storitev v 
o~eh uporabnikov revizijskih poro~il, so bile obsežne spremembe, pove-
zane z nadzorom revizijske dejavnosti, nujne. Ponovna vzpostavitev zau-
panja v revizijsko stroko, pove~anje verodostojnosti javno dostopnih 
ra~unovodskih poro~il ter stabiliziranje finan~nih trgov so bili glavni cilji 
zaostrene zakonodaje, tako Sarbanes - Oxleyevega zakona iz leta 2002 v 
ZDA kot tudi Direktive 2006/43/ES o obveznih revizijah letnih in konsolidi-
ranih ra~unovodskih izkazov družb iz leta 2006 v Evropski uniji.  
^lanek opisuje razli~ne poti razvoja sistemov obvladovanja kakovosti 
revidiranja v Evropski uniji in v Združenih državah Amerike ter sisteme, ki 
so bili v EU in v ZDA uvedeni za potrebe izvajanja javnega nadzora nad 
dejavnostjo revidiranja. Predstavljene so tudi glavne ugotovitve nekaterih 
empiri~nih raziskav, ki se osredoto~ajo na prou~evanje vpliva novih 
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mehanizmov javnega nadzora nad revidiranjem revizijskih storitev, ki jih 
izvajajo revizijske družbe.  
Poznavanje posledic uvedbe novih sistemov javnega nadzora nad 
revidiranjem je klju~nega pomena iz dveh razlogov. Prvi~, ker je to pod-
ro~je povezano z zelo aktualno razpravo o prednostih in slabostih razli~nih 
vrst nadzora, ki so na eni strani povezane z visoko ravnjo strokovnega 
znanja (obi~ajno se visoka strokovnost pripisuje sistemu medsebojnega 
nadzora oz. sistemu »peer review«), na drugi strani pa z visoko ravnjo 
neodvisnosti (le-ta je v najve~ji meri zagotovljena z neodvisnim nadzorom 
oz. s sistemom »monitoring«). In drugi~, ker je pomembno spremljati, 
kako novo uvedeni sistemi obvladovanja kakovosti vplivajo na kakovost 
revizijskih storitev in kak{ne signale o dejanski kakovosti tak{en sistem 
po{ilja uporabnikom revizijskih poro~il. 
V Združenih državah Amerike vse ve~ raziskovalcev prou~uje razlike 
med novo uvedenim sistemom javnega nadzora (ki ga v ZDA izvaja Odbor 
za javni nadzor oz. Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board – 
PCAOB) in nekdanjo samoregulacijo revizijske dejavnosti, ki se je izvajala 
prek sistema medsebojnega nadzora (»peer review«).  
Anantharaman (2007, str. 33) na primer ugotavlja, da revizijske druž-
be, ki se tudi same ukvarjajo z izvajanjem medsebojnega nadzora, redno 
prejemajo bolj{a poro~ila o kakovosti od izvajalcev nadzora v sistemu 
medsebojnega nadzora kot od PCAOB. Na podlagi izsledkov raziskave 
avtor ugotavlja tudi, da revizijske družbe, ki izvajajo medsebojne preglede 
in za katere je manj verjetno, da dosledno ustrezajo kriterijem neodvisnos-
ti (gre predvsem za manj{e revizijske družbe) in tudi revizijske družbe, ki 
so se v ve~ji meri specializirale za izvajanje medsebojnih pregledov, prav 
tako pridobivajo bistveno bolj ugodna mnenja iz medsebojnih pregledov 
kot od PCAOB.  
Gunny in Zhang (2006, str. 12) poro~ata, da mnenja, ki izhajajo iz med-
sebojnih pregledov, niso povezana s kakovostjo izkazanega poslovnega 
izida (»earnings quality«) pri naro~nikih revizijskih storitev revizijske druž-
be. Potrdila pa sta hipotezo, da je kakovost izkazanega poslovnega izida 
pri strankah revizijske družbe povezana z mnenjem, ki ga izda PCAOB kot 
organ javnega nadzora. Avtorja tako ugotavljata, da imajo revizijske druž-
be, ki prejemajo pozitivna mnenja PCAOB, stranke z vi{jo kakovostjo izka-
zanih poslovnih izidov. 
DeFond (2009, str. 2) ugotavlja, da imajo novi in{pektorji kot izvajalci 
javnega nadzora v primerjavi z nekdanjim sistemom samoregulacije v 
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rokah u~inkovitej{e mehanizme, na podlagi katerih lahko uveljavljajo strožje 
standarde kakovosti, in sicer pravi, da "... za razliko od izvajalcev medseboj-
nega nadzora lahko in{pektorji PCAOB v primeru nekaterih pomembnej{ih 
odkritih nepravilnostih sprožijo ukrepe, katerih posledice so visoke kazni 
za revizijske družbe. Ti ukrepi vklju~ujejo prijavljanje nepravilnosti organu, 
zadolženemu za nadzor borz in vrednostnic (Securities and Exchange 
Commission – SEC), posredovanje izsledkov o morebitnih ugotovljenih 
kriminalnih dejanjih Ministrstvu za pravosodje in disciplinske ukrepe, ki jih 
izvaja neposredno PCAOB«. Avtor meni, da so zato revizijske družbe že v 
fazi pri~akovanja javnega nadzora motivirane k izbolj{evanju kakovosti 
revizijskih storitev.  
Nekatere dodatne dokaze, ki kažejo, da se je po uvedbi Sarbanes – 
Oxleyevega zakona kakovost revizijskih storitev, z njo pa tudi kakovost 
ra~unovodskih poro~il družb, v katerih se izvaja revidiranje ra~unovodskih 
izkazov, izbolj{ala, podajajo tudi Cohen, Dey in Lys (2008). Avtorji potrjuje-
jo, da so po uvedbi zakona vse manj zaznani primeri prilagajanja poslov-
nega izida pri naro~nikih revizijskih storitev. Lobo in Zhou (2006) pa doda-
jata, da so po uvedbi zakona revizorji postali bolj konservativni.  
Medtem, ko je bilo v Združenih državah Amerike objavljenih že nekaj 
raziskav s tega podro~ja, pa rezultatov tovrstnih raziskav v Evropski uniji 
{e ni. Državam ~lanicam EU je bila namre~ ob uvedbi Direktive 2006/43/ES 
o obveznih revizijah letnih in konsolidiranih ra~unovodskih izkazov družb 
dana možnost, da zahteve direktive vklju~ijo v svoje nacionalne zakonoda-
je v roku dveh let, to je do sredine leta 2008. V ZDA so minila vsaj {tiri leta 
od uvedbe Sarbanes – Oxleyevega zakona leta 2002 do objave prvih 
izsledkov raziskav v prvorazrednih revijah s podro~ja ra~unovodstva in 
revizije, kot so npr. Accounting Horizons (Lobo and Zhou, 2006), The 
Accounting Review (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008) in Journal of Accounting 
and Economics (DeFond, 2009). Avtorja menita, da gre razloge za zaosta-
nek na podro~ju prou~evanja posledic uvedbe novih sistemov javnega 
nadzora nad revidiranjem na kakovostjo revizijskih storitev v Evropski 
uniji pripisati predvsem dejstvu, da doslej {e ni bilo na voljo kakovostnih 
primerljivih podatkov, ki bi lahko služili kot osnova za izvedbo kakovostne 
statisti~ne analize. 
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